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ABSTRACT
The term domino effect denotes a chain of accidents, or situations, in which a fire/explosion
load generated by an accident in one unit in an industry causes secondary and higher order
accidents in other units. Such chains of accidents have a greater propensity to cause damage
than stand-alone accidents. Most of the past risk assessment studies deal with accident in
a single industry, more so in one of the units of an industry. But, often, accident in one unit
causes a secondary accident in a nearby unit, which in turn may trigger a tertiary accident,
and so on. The probability of occurrence and adverse impacts of such ‘domino’ or
‘cascading’ effects are increasing due to increasing congestion in industrial complexes
and increasing density of human population around such complexes. Accidents with domino
effect are seldom studied. LPG storage areas could produce the worst possible consequences
in the event of an unforeseen incident. This work illustrates the application of models to
evaluate the impacts of events with fire and explosion in LPG tanks on other similar units
in the park and the possibility of occurrence of a domino effect. The criteria for occurrence
of accidents with domino effect adopted in this work were 37.5 kW/m2 in case of fire
radiation and an overpressure of 0.7 atm in explosion cases in a receptor body. The spacing
between LPG tanks was evaluated. The results show that such spacing is minimal and
does not represent, as it should, a parameter indicating a safe distance able to prevent the
propagation of an accident with domino effect.
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NOMENCLATURE
A result of Eq. (6)
b constant
c constant
d constant
Hc combustion heat, J/kg
Hrel relative humidity
L distance from the center of the fire ball to
the receptor body, m
m mass of the inflammable substance present
in the steam cloud, kg
mf mass of the substance involved in the fire
ball, kg
Op peak of pressure, psi
q radiation received by the receptor body,
W/m2
Rf radiant fraction of the ignition heat
x distance between the surface of the fireball
and the receptive body, m
X distance between the center of the explosion
and the receptor body, ft
mTNT mass equivalent of TNT in lb equal in effect
to the mass m in kg
Greek symbols
τa atmospheric transmissivity
η efficiency of the explosion
INTRODUCTION
In the analysis of ‘conventional’ risks, the
process units of a petro-chemical plant are
examined separately, taken into consideration only
their intrinsic risks. When the process risks of two
or more units are analyzed simultaneously, the
resulting risk of the plant can be potentialized in
such a way that a chemical accident that originated
in one of the units of the plant can cause its impact
to trigger new accidents in other units in a chain
reaction known as the domino effect. This can lead
to more disastrous consequences than the ones
expected from isolated risks in each one of the
process units. The same analysis can be applied to
distinct industrial plants located in the same
industrial park separated by regulated distances that
certainly do not prevent the simultaneity of the risks
of distinct process units. It concerns a more realistic
view on the process risks (Khan and Abbasi, 2001).
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9Very little research has been done on the
effects of accidents with domino effect. The manner
in which the subject has been approached in literature
almost always restricts itself to descriptions and
interpretations of the occurred events and
phenomena in a qualitative way (Khan and Abbasi,
1999). In one of the few quantitative studies on
domino effect accidents, Latha et al. (1992), the
various manners in which accidents with fire can
provoke domino effect accidents were studied.
Besides fire, the most common forms of domino
effect accidents are explosion events in which
fragments of tank surfaces are launched or pressure
waves occur. According to Kourniotis et al. (2000),
the movement of inflammable substances when
transported under pressure is the most common
cause of accidents with domino effect.
Nowadays, legislation in various countries
already demands evaluations on the possible
occurrences of domino effect accidents in risk analysis
studies. In Brazil, such a legislation has not been
implemented yet, but with the ratification of the
Number 174 Convention of the OIT – International
Labour Organization (Brasil, 2002), it has become
clear that it is very unlikely, considering this new
world reality, that this topic will not be included in
the regulations that are to come.
The storage areas of LPG tank park in petro-
chemical plants are areas that are quite susceptible
to occurrences of chemical accidents with domino
effect, triggered mainly by fire or explosion, due to
the large inventory of inflammable products that
normally accumulate as well as to the operational
conditions itself – high pressure and temperatures
above the normal boiling point.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate
the dimension of the impact caused by chemical
accidents triggered by fire and/or explosion in LPG
tank parks and to evaluate its potential to cause
secondary accidents, that is, a domino effect. The
spacing between tanks located in the same park or
between these and process units, as foreseen in
codes and national and international norms, will
be evaluated.
METHODOLOGY
The scenarios studied in this article will be
based on the occurrence of fire and/or explosion
as primary events in a LPG tank park.
Fire as Initiatory Event
In case of fire, radiation is the main effect.
The higher the quantity of substances involved in
the accident, and also the closer to the source of the
accident, the higher the radiation will be. According
to AlChE, cited by Khan and Abbasi (1998), a heat
flow of 37.5 kW/m2 is sufficient to cause severe
damage to process equipment in other installations
that operate under atmospheric conditions and,
consequently, sufficient to provoke new accidents.
In case of an operation involving temperature and
pressure, a heat flow of this intensity makes the
adjacent areas even more vulnerable.
The radiation of a ball of fire incident on a
receptor body at a distance L from the center of the
same can be expressed by Eq. (1) (Louvar and
Louvar, 1998).
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where q is the radiation received by the receptor
body in W/m2, Hc is the combustion heat in J/kg;
mf is the mass in kg of the substance involved in
the fire ball; τa is the atmospheric transmissivity;
Rf is the radiant fraction of the ignition heat and L
is the distance from the center of the fire ball to the
receptor body. This study intends to evaluate the
quantity in relation to the stored quantity mf
determining the value of q equal to 37.5 kW/m2.
Reorganizing the Eq. (1), we obtain Eq. (2):
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with τa given by Louvar and Louvar (1998):
)..1.14log( 13.0108.0  xHrelaW (3)
where Hrel is the relative humidity and x the distance
between the surface of the fireball and the receptive
body in meters using the spacing between the unit
tanks. The following parameters were used in the
simulations: 50% for Hrel, 0.3 for Rf and Hc equal
to 46333 J/kg for LPG.
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Explosion as Initiatory Event
In case of explosion the damaging effects
are the result of overpressure originated by
shockwaves of the steam cloud involved in the
accident. According to Khan and Abbasi (1998), a
peak of pressure resulting from a 0.7 atm explosion
is enough to cause severe damage to process
equipment and thus provoke new accidents, either
associated to new explosions or new events
involving fire.
The peak of pressure in an explosion of a
steam cloud incident on a receptor body at a
distance L from the center of the latter can be
expressed by Eq. (4):
AmX TNT .
3/1 (4)
where X is the distance in ft between the center of
the explosion and the receptor body and mTNT is
the mass equivalent of TNT in lb able to cause the
same effect as the mass m in kg of the inflammable
substance contained in the steam cloud:
4686
...205.2 Kc
TNT
Hm
m  (5)
where m is the mass of the inflammable substance
in kg present in the steam cloud and η is the
efficiency of the explosion.
The parameter A is the result of Eq. (6),
where Op represents the peak of pressure in psi,
which is to be evaluated based on the location of
the explosion. (USA, 1998)
))ln(.)ln(.exp( 2pp OdOcbA   (6)
where: b, c, and d are constant and equal to 3.5031,
-0.7241 and 0.0398, respectively.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the
quantity X in relation to the stored quantity m,
converted into the TNT mass equivalent by Eq. (5)
and fixing the Op value equal to 10.23 psi (0.7 atm)
and η equal to 0.03 and Hc equal to 46.333 kJ/kg.
Spacing Between Tanks
The spacing between LPG storage tanks is
usually fixed based on the accumulated experience
in similar plants, which has certainly given rise to
a series of existent norms or standards. Often such
references are observed without due analyses of
the risks of each plant and without verifying to what
extend these distances provide security. Taking into
account the reality of the domino effect accidents,
new minimum spacing values between tanks must
be adopted, since the risks tend to become
potentialized. Also a project criterion, as to the non-
occurrence of such accidents, can be utilized to
determine the location of the tanks.
There are few existent standards in Brazil
that deal with spacing between tanks and other
units. The regulating norm NR-20 (Brasil, 1978)
is one of them, however it concerns a quite
antiquated legal implement, limited and hardly
enlightening. Another more recent norm (Brasil,
1999) suggests that the minimum distance between
one LPG vessel and another vessel storing either
LPG or other inflammable product under pressure,
should be in accordance with the following
minimum measures:
a) for spherical vessels:
½ the diameter (in case of different diameters,
regard the biggest);
b) for cylindrical vessels in one battery:
¾ diameter (in case of different diameters, regard
the biggest), however not less than 1.5 meters;
c) from spheres to cylinders or battery of cylinders:
½ diameter of the sphere, however not less than
7.5 meters;
d) between batteries of cylinders:
7.5 meters.
The parameters L and X were compared to
regulated minimum distances as to determine
whether the latter follows the requirements of non-
occurrence of domino effect accidents.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Initially, a basic measurement of the LPG
storage tanks was made taking into account the
spherical and cylindrical shapes of the tanks as well
as the LPG storage capacity at 25ºC. The volume
equivalent to the LPG mass stored with a 10% factor
added was used as a criterion for the measurement
of the spherical tanks. For the cylindrical tanks the
same volumes as for the spherical tanks were used
with optimal L/D ratios suggested by the Process
Associates of America (2004).
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Table 1 shows the values, obtained by the
measurement of the tanks with the same capacity,
that constitute the hypothetical tank park here
studied, as well as the respective spacing between
tanks, taking into consideration the criterion of the
PETROBRAS norm (Brasil, 1999),
aforementioned. In this table the values D/2 and
3/4D represent, respectively, the spacing between
spherical and cylindrical tanks obtained based on
their diameters and the utilized norm. LTT represents
the distance between the tangent lines of the
horizontal cylindrical tanks.
Table 1. Tank dimensions and spacing between
tanks (m) versus LPG Storage Capacity (ton)
Next, scenarios involving fire and
explosion were created using a ‘worst case’
methodology, which involves all of the LPG
content present in the two tanks in the accident.
The fire and explosion events were examined
separately and their respective impacts, capable of
provoking successive accidents of equal potential
in other similar tanks in the same park, were
determined. Table 2 presents the results of this
range based on the storage capacity in the tank
where the event originated. It is important to bear
in mind that for cylindrical tank diameters, D/1.82,
a minimum spacing foreseen by the norm was
adopted.
When analyzing the results in Tabs. 1 and
2, it can be noted that the values for L as well as
the values for X are much higher than the distances
D/2 and 3/4D for spherical or cylindrical tanks
respectively. We can conclude from this affirmative
that such spacing is not able to prevent the
propagation of similar events to other tanks in a
domino effect. Figure 1 presents a visualization of
the comparison of these values. From this figure it
can also be concluded that the range of accidents
triggered by fire is further than the ones triggered
by explosion for any of the geometric shapes of
the tanks studied.
The maximum value of the relation
between the range and the spacing between the
tanks can be taken from Tab. 1 and 2, seeking to
determine a coefficient for such spacing in order
to make them acceptable when an analysis of
domino effect is contemplated.
Table 2. Impact caused by Fire (L) and Explosion
(X) in LPG tanks
Figure 1. Relation between the range of the
accidents and the spacing between the tanks
Table 3 presents a summary of the obtained
relations. When analyzing such numbers, it can be
observed that the distances foreseen by the norm,
should be increased about 3 and 5 times for
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spherical and cylindrical tanks, respectively, so that
the criteria here studied, the occurrence of domino
effects, will not be attained.
Table 3. Relation between the obtained range and
the spacing as foreseen by the norm.
CONCLUSIONS
The evaluation of the impact of a domino
effect accident should be an integrated constituent
of any study of risk analysis. It concerns a recent
reality noticed due to the tragic history of many
past accidents and a more realistic way of dealing
with intrinsic risks of chemical and petrochemical
plants. The domino effect accidents are almost
always triggered by fire and/or explosion in some
process units, their damage being propagated to
other units and able to provoke secondary accidents
in other equipments or process units. In this
research, it was shown that LPG tank parks are
vulnerable with regard to the occurrence of domino
effect accidents. The spacing between tanks was
evaluated in relation to the adherence to this
parameter as a protection measure against accidents
of this nature. The impact caused by fire and
explosion in LPG tanks is strong enough to destroy
other tanks and to overcome ‘safe’ distances
adopted in many plants, usually based on
antiquated technical norms that have not
incorporated the domino effect reality yet. The
simple implementation of spacing between tanks
or process units suggested by technical norms has
become a practice of antiquated engineering.
Analysis of the process risks, as well as evaluation
of the consequences of the most probable accidents
and the incorporation of a study on the possibility
of domino effects have become vital in order to
minimize these effects. The results obtained in this
study can be quite enlightening in relation to the
spacing that can be adopted as yet another plant
security measure.
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